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Prosecuting under Animal 
Welfare Legislation: Why 
Time is of the Essence? 
 
Steve Forster, Senior Law Lecturer specialising in 




This article exams both the 
legislative provisions and 
authorities surrounding the 
application of jurisdictional time 
limitations in commencing criminal 
proceedings for animal protection 
offences in the magistrates’ court 
and highlights the difficulties and 
consequences that are often 
encountered without paying careful 
attention to them. In particular, the 
article focuses on how the courts 
have construed s.31 of the Animal 
Welfare Act 2006 and seeks to 
evaluate the legal principles derived 
from those authorities in a 
comprehensive way to assist the 
reader with a better understanding 
from both a prosecution and 
defence perspective. The article 
 
1 Trustee’s Report & Accounts 2018, 
www.rspca.org.uk 
also looks at the changes to be 
made to sentencing provisions by 
the Animal Welfare (Sentencing) Bill 
2019 and, importantly, the 
reclassification of several offences 
as triable either way and the impact 
this will have on the prosecution of 




According to the RSPCA 2018 
Annual Report, the charity dealt 
with 1,182 cases that warranted a 
prosecutorial decision, of which 747 
defendants were convicted for a 
total 1,678 offences leading to a 
success rate of 92.5%1. In contrast, 
the CPS in the same year dealt with 
just under 495,000 prosecutions 
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with an 83.7% conviction rate2. 
Nevertheless, the RSPCA, being a 
registered charity, has no special 
prosecutorial status or authority 
and simply acts in the capacity of a 
private prosecutor when 
commencing criminal proceedings.  
 
Whilst the DPP has a statutory 
power under s.6(2) of the 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 
(POA 1985) to intervene in such 
proceedings, which can be either 
discontinued or continued, (subject 
to an evaluative assessment of the 
sufficiency of the admissible 
evidence and the public interest), it 
is a recognised right, preserved 
under s.6(1) of the POA 1985, of a 
private citizen to enforce the 
criminal law by commencing 
criminal proceedings, as confirmed 
by the Supreme Court in Gujra v CPS 
[2013] 1 AC 484 and reinforced in R 
(Kay) v Leeds Mags Court [2018] 4 
WLR, & Charlson v Guildford 
Magistrates [2006] 1 WLR 34943. 
 
2 Annual Report & Accounts 2018-19, 
www.cps.gov.uk 
3 See para 46 in Soni (Wasted Costs Order) 
2019 EWCA Crim 1304  
4 See Qualter v Preston Crown Court 
[2019] EWHC 2583 
5 Welfare of Farmed Animals (England) 
Regs 2007 SI 2078, Welfare of Animals 
(Slaughter or Killing) Res 1995 SI 731, 
Welfare at Time of Killing (England) Regs 
2015 S1, Mandatory Use of closed Circuit 
Unlike an individual citizen, the 
RSPCA is supported by a dedicated 
prosecutions department together 
with the necessary resources to 
commence proceedings under 
animal welfare legislation. 
 
Whilst other agencies, such as Local 
Authorities4, DEFRA, CPS and the 
FSA principally enforce other 
legislation protecting the welfare of 
farmed animals and 
slaughterhouses5, the primary aim 
of the RSPCA is the safeguarding of 
domesticated animals6. There is 
little doubting the valuable 
contribution the RSPCA make to 
criminal enforcement in protecting 
animals, but it is this vested interest 
that has led to criticism7 and an 
independent review of its 
operations8. Recently however 
District Judge Barron sitting at 
Folkestone Magistrates Court 
questioned the independency of the 
Television in Slaughterhouses (England) 
Reg 2018 SI 556.    
6 Prosecution should be instigated on 
“good grounds” and all enquires and 
other remedies being exhausted, see 
RSPCA v Johnson [2009] EWHC 2702  
7 HofC EFRAC Report “Animal welfare in 
England: domestic pets” 2016-17 
8 Wooler Review 2014 published at 
www.rspca.org.uk 
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RSPCA in respect of biased publicity 
surrounding the case of Mark 
Burgess and its legitimacy to 
conduct its own prosecutions.9  
 
Nevertheless, the current role of the 
RSPCA does have the support of the 
Government who do not consider it 
necessary to designate the RSPCA as 
a specialist prosecuting authority10. 
Accordingly, as a professional body, 
there is a public interest in ensuring 
that any prosecution instigated by 
the RSPCA is done so properly and 
with sufficient regard to the 
 
9 See report (page 5) in Times newspaper 
Thursday 26 Sept 2019  
jurisdictional and procedural 
obligations underpinning criminal 
proceedings11. In particular are the 
differing statutory time limits to 
bringing a prosecution which must 
be adhered to. However, any 
oversight could lead to either a stay 
of proceedings or a conviction being 
quashed and a consequential loss of 
confidence. It is this failure which 
has resulted in a number of appeals 
coming before the High Court. This 
article will therefore seek to analyse 
the statutory time limitations in 
light of these judgments and 
10 See page 5 of Govt response to the  
EFRAC report, 7 Feb 2017 HC 2017  
11 See Valiati v DPP [2018] EWHC 2908  
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provide some guidance to 
prosecutors. 
 
Animal Protection Offences 
 
The main primary piece of 
legislation is the Animal Welfare Act 
2006. A codifying Act that seeks to 
draw together previous legislation 
promoting the welfare and 
protection of animals12 on the one 
hand and the prevention of 
cruelty/harm on the other. An 
animal for the purposes of the Act 
(s.1) must constitute a non-human 
subphylum vertebrate species (i.e. 
reptiles, birds, mammals). The 
range of offences available 
essentially fall into two main 
categories. 
 
The first category contained in ss4-8 
covers the ambit of cruelty, namely 
unnecessary suffering (s.4 
offence)13, mutilation (s.5 offence), 
dock tailing (s.6 offence), poisoning 
(s.7 offence)14, and fighting (s.8 
 
12 It is now a specified offence to use wild 
animals for circus performance-see the 
Wild Animals in Circuses Act 2019, see the 
case of Bobby Roberts and the ill-
treatment of Anne an Asian elephant.   
13 For the regulation of necessary 
suffering in animal testing, see the 
Animals (Scientific Procedures)Act 1986 & 
European Directive 2010/63/EU 
14 In a different context on the meaning of 
poisoning in the OPPA 1861, see the 
offence). All these offences can be 
committed in several ways, either as 
a primary offender or a secondary 
party, by permitting the prohibited 
act or omission. Each offence is 
wide ranging in its ambit (s.8 for 
instance dealing with fighting can be 
committed in 14 possible 
circumstances)15. Some are quasi-
strict liability with a lawful authority 
or reasonable excuse defence, 
whilst others such as unnecessary 
suffering that involve the primary 
offender (s.4(1)) requires proof of 
mens rea either actual knowledge 
that the animal is suffering or likely 
to suffer unnecessarily, or 
objectively ought to have known 
this by his negligent act or omission, 
subject to a mistaken belief 
defence16. Similarly, a secondary 
party (provided they hold 
responsibility for the animal) will 
attract criminal liability by either (1) 
permitting or (2) failing in all the 
circumstances to take reasonable 
steps to protect the animal from the 
illuminating discussion in R v Veysey 
[2019] EWCA Crim 1332 & also Cruelty 
Free International v SofS HD [2017] EWHC 
3295  
15 For application see Wright v RSPCA 
[2017] EWHC 2643 & RSPCA v McCormick 
[2016] EWHC 928 
16 This accords with the legislative intent-
see the detailed judgment in RSPCA v Grey 
[2013] EWHC 500 
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cruelty of another. Although it is a 
necessary ingredient that the 
offender is aware of the potential 
harm, the culpability arises from 
unreasonably ignoring or avoiding it 
which is objectively determined17.    
     
Section 9 sets out the second 
category covering welfare 
protection and specifically imposes 
criminal liability on those who hold 
an s.3 responsibly for an animal and 
fail to take all reasonable steps in all 
the circumstances18 to engage in 
good practice of ensuring the 
animal’s needs are sufficiently 
catered for, in terms of 
environment, food and behaviour. 
Section 9 which clearly overlaps 
with an s.4 offence depending on 
the circumstances is less culpable 
than s.4 and therefore can treated 
either as a separate offence or as an 
alternative to s.4 without being 
duplicitous, provided the conduct 
relating to the s.9 offence is wider 
than the conduct of unnecessary 
suffering19. A more extensive list of 
 
17 See Riley v CPS [2016] EWHC 2531 
18 Any alleged failure is based on a “purely 
objective standard of care” which accords 
with the legislative intent of the Act- see 
RSPCA v Grey [2013] EWHC 500    
19 See RSPCA v Grey [2013] EWHC 500 
20 As amended by 2010 SI 3033. These 
regulations were created by the relevant 
Minster using the power conferred on 
him under s.12. 
specified welfare protection duties 
exists for farm animals in the 
Welfare of Farmed Animals 
(England) Regs 2007 SI 207820. The 
offence creating provision is 
regulation 4 which imposes criminal 
liability on a responsible person 
who fails in their duty to take all 
reasonable steps to ensure a farmed 
animal21 is bred or kept in 
accordance with the 30 specified 
conditions contained in schedule 
1.22 
   
Section 32 as amended by 
the Animal Welfare 
(Sentencing) Bill 2019 
 
Section 32 of the AWA 2006 
stipulates that the maximum 
sentence of imprisonment for all the 
offences is 6 months and or a fine23 
and therefore treated as minor 
summary offences triable only in 
the Magistrates Court24. This was 
seen as wholly ineffectual, 
particularly in unnecessary suffering 
cases in which a number of reported 
21 Defined in reg 3 
22 Reg 5 deals with poultry duties & reg 6 
deals with compliance with the relevant 
code of practice in force. 
23 See Magistrates’ Court Sentencing 
Guidelines on Animal Cruelty Offences on 
the imposition of sentencing, see also 
Williamson v RSPCA [2018] EWHC 880.   
24 See s.2 of the MCA 1980 
UK Centre for Animal Law | Volume 3, Issue 2 December 2019 
  
7 
cases involving appalling and 
sustained cruelty, and in some 
instances sadistically filmed and 
shared on social media for which 
the offenders received minimal 
punishment that often does not 
nearly reflect the gravity and 
culpability of the offending,  as 
rightly being abhorrent25. Section 
142 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
states that the aim of sentencing 
includes the punishment of 
offenders and the reduction in 
crime by imposing deterrent 
sentencing.  
 
Neither of these objectives are 
being met by the existing 
sentencing range for animal cruelty. 
Recognising the inadequacies in 
sentencing and the tireless 
campaign led by Anna Turley MP, 
the Animal Welfare (Sentencing) Bill 
2019 which has cross party support 
and is currently before 
Parliament26. This radically reforms 
the sentencing provisions, by 
amending s.32 and reclassifying the 
offences contained in ss4-8, as 
either-way offences and increasing 
 
25 See the debate pack “Sentencing for 
animal cruelty” (CDP-22106/0202 3rd Nov 
2016 presented by Anna Turley MP 
promoting her PMB which unfortunately 
was unsuccessful.  
26 Unfortunately the Bill failed to 
complete all its Parliamentary stages due 
to the sudden prorogation of Parliament. 
the maximum sentence if convicted 
on indictment to five years. It will be 
expected that the Sentencing 
Council will revise the current 
guidelines and the level of 
culpability and harm, the indicative 
starting point, balanced against any 
non-exhaustive aggravating and 
mitigating factors.  
 
The comparable offence in the 
Republic of Ireland which is subject 
to a 5 year term of imprisonment 
was recently considered in the 
sentencing case of DPP v Kavanagh 
[2019] IECA 110, in which the Court 
of Appeal upheld a sentence of 3 
years imposed on the appellant who 
had pleaded guilty to 30 counts on 
an indictment containing 126 
counts. The appellant had been 
involved in a large-scale operation 
of movement of dogs for 
commercial gain. Rightly describing 
the scenes at the farm of death and 
suffering as being “a truly shocking 
one” and “of exceptional 
seriousness” fully merited the 
sentence imposed.          
 
Nevertheless, the Bill is expected to be 
reintroduced in the next Parliamentary 
session having been announced in the 
Queen’s Speech on the 14 Oct 2019. 
Given the support for the legislation this 
article is presented on the expectation 
that the Bill will pass in its current drafted 
form which is likely to be in 2020.     
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Whilst this is undoubtedly a 
welcome reform in the protection of 
animals. It will be interesting to see 
whether the RSPCA is able to absorb 
not only the financial implications 
with increased costs, but the extra 
demands place upon it in the Crown 
Court, or will the CPS as a public 
prosecutor take on the more serious 
cases whilst the RSPCA continue to 
deal with the summary cases? It will 
be equally interesting to see what 
impact this change will have on how 
a defendant chooses to plead. They 
may prefer to test the evidence 
before a jury, rather than a 
Magistrates court, with potentially 
more disputed cases going to the 
Crown Court. Conversely, a risk of a 
higher sentence and the potential 
impact of any distressing images on 
the jury may encourage guilty pleas.   
Of obvious importance is that the 
welfare offence contained in s.9 
remains a summary-only offence 
unaffected by the change and in 
effect becomes a less culpable 
offence to the now more serious s.4 
offence. However, despite the 
potential overlap between the 
factual circumstances between the 
two offences, s.9 is not a specified 
linked summary offence for the 
purposes of s.40 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988 and cannot 
therefore be joined in the same 
indictment as an alternative to 
charging an indictable s.4 offence 
and would have to be dealt with 
separately in the magistrates court. 
Neither can a count be added later 
in the Crown Court under s.6(3) of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1967. 
Without careful consideration it is 
easy to misconstrue the 
jurisdictional power of the court, a 
point highlighted in R v Buckley 
[2009] EWCA Crim 1178 and 
repeated in R v Williams [2011] 
EWCA Crim 1716. In both cases the 
Court of Appeal had to quash the 
sentences on the bases of being 
convicted of the lesser, non-
aggravated form of having a dog 
dangerously out of control under s.3 
of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, a 
summary-only offence not specified 
in s.40 and therefore not within the 
jurisdiction of the Crown Court.      
       
Commencing criminal 
proceedings in the 
Magistrates’ Court 
 
Section 21 of the Access to Justice 
Act 1999 defines criminal 
proceedings as proceedings before 
any court for dealing with an 
individual accused of an offence. 
Likewise, Lord Bingham in  Majesty's 
Commissioner for Customs and 
Excise v City of London Magistrates' 
Court [2000] 2 Cr App R 348 
confirmed that “the general 
understanding that criminal 
UK Centre for Animal Law | Volume 3, Issue 2 December 2019 
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proceedings involve a formal 
accusation made on behalf of the 
State or by a private prosecutor that 
a defendant has committed a 
breach of the criminal law, and the 
State or the private prosecutor has 
instituted proceedings which may 
culminate in the conviction and 
condemnation of the defendant."  
 
In bringing a private prosecution the 
informant, unlike the CPS, does not 
have to satisfy the evidential and 
public interest test. Whilst the 
criterion is much less onerous, it 
would be wise for organisations like 
the RSPCA to adopt either the code 
for crown prosecutors, or apply 
similar criteria27.  In R (Kay) v Leeds 
Magistrates’ Court [2018] 4 WLR, 
the High Court emphasised that any 
private prosecutor, is still “subject 
to the same obligations as a 
Minister for Justice as are the public 
prosecuting authorities -including 
the duty to ensure that all relevant 
material is made both for the court 
and the defence.”  
 
Likewise, any professional advocate 
having conduct of a private 
prosecution must display “the 
highest standards of integrity” and 
 
27 See Wooler Review 2014 Chapter 6 and 
generally on the code Queen(Torpey) v 
DPP [2019] EWHC 1804   
have full regard for the public 
interest and fulling their duties, not 
to mislead the court and ensuring 
the proceedings are fair. This 
unquestionably invokes the 
common law “duty of candour” of 
“full and frank disclosure”, including 
any adverse information, which 
would assist the court and is now 
reflected in Part 7 of the CrimPR 
2015.28   
 
Part 7 of the Criminal Procedure 
Rules 2015, as amended sets out the 
necessary conditions in applying for 
and issuing a summons. This is a 
two-stage procedure, the first step 
is the formal laying of information of 
the alleged offence(s), followed by 
the magistrates serving (issuing) a 
summons to attend court.   
 
Rule 7.2 provides that the 
prosecutor must first serve on the 
court a written application which 
must fully conform with rule 7.3 by 
sufficiently identifying the relevant 
offence(s) which is known to law 
and providing brief particulars of 
the alleged conduct that constitutes 
the alleged offence(s). In addition, 
not only must a prosecutor (other 
than a public authority)29 
28 See also Suleman v Leeds District Mags 
[2017] EWHC 3656 
29 s.17 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 
1986 
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demonstrate that the application 
accords with any statutory time 
stipulations (rule 7.2) but must also, 
under rule 7.2(5&6), provide 
sufficient grounds to justify that the 
defendant has committed the 
alleged offences, endorsed by a 
statement of truth that all the 
material evidence is available and all 
relevant information is disclosed. 
 
In R (Kay) v Leeds Magistrates’ Court 
[2018] 4 WLR, the High Court 
provided valuable and useful 
guidance on the legal framework 
governing the summons procedure 
in the Magistrates Court. Sweeney J 
who gave the leading judgment, 
noted that the issuing of a court 
summons is exclusively “a judicial 
function involving the exercise of a 
discretion which is subject to 
control by judicial review.” Any 
application for a summons is a 
preliminary step to instituting 
criminal proceedings, and that the 
guiding principles gleaned from the 
previous authorities oblige the 
magistrates to issue a summons 
promptly unless there are 
“compelling reasons not to do so” 
such as the application is time 
barred, lacks jurisdiction, is 
defective, vexatious, or an abuse of 
process. In Westminster Mags 
(Johnston) v Ball [2019] EWHC 1709, 
the High Court decisively ruled that 
the threshold test to issuing a 
UK Centre for Animal Law | Volume 3, Issue 2 December 2019 
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summons is not a low one as 
contended by the complainant. On 
the contrary “when determining an 
application for a summons a 
magistrate must ascertain whether 
the allegation is of an offence 
known to law, and if so whether the 
essential ingredients of the offence 
are prima facie present”30.   
 
The court must protect the criminal 
process from any malpractice or 
manipulation of it by the 
prosecution and must not be seen 
to condone such conduct. If the 
misconduct is such as to deprive the 
defendant of any protection under 
the law and suffer unfairness, then 
the proceedings ought to be stayed 
as an abuse of process. The relevant 
principles have been authoritatively 
clarified in R v Maxwell [2011] 1 
WLR 1837 by the Supreme Court 
and based on two limbs, either it is 
now impossible to give the accused 
a fair trial, or a fair trial is still 
possible but offends the “court’s 
sense of justice and propriety.” The 
burden of proving an abuse is on the 
defendant on a balance of 
probabilities31. An insuperable 
hurdle given the power to stay 
 
30 See also R (DPP) v Sunderland MC 
[2014] EWHC 61 
31 See DPP v Fell [2013] EWHC 562 
32 In RSPCA v Webb [2015] EWHC 3802, 
the High Court left open the question 
should only be used in exceptional 
cases, but very much dependent on 
the individual facts of each case in 
question.    
    
Statutory Time limitations 
under the Animal Welfare 
Act  
 
Unless otherwise stated, all 
summary offences are subject to 
s.127 of the Magistrates Court Act 
1980 which places a statutory time 
limit on commencing criminal 
summary proceedings. This 
prevents the trial of an offence, 
unless the information was laid 
within six months from the time 
when the offence(s) was 
committed32. If the offence involves 
a course of conduct or acts 
committed “continuously or 
intermittently, over a period of 
time” then, as stated in DPP v Baker 
[2004] EWHC 2782, the time limit 
starts from the final incident.    
 
For the purposes of calculating the 
duration of the statutory time 
restrictions, the High Court in 
Rockall v DFRA [2007] 1 WLR 2666 
having reviewed the previous 
whether proceedings for a civil order 
under s.20 of the AWA 2006 to dispose of 
any animals seized under s.18(5) amounts 
to a complaint and therefore subject to 
s.127.  
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authorities, ruled that the laying of 
information arose when the 
information is “made available to 
the justices, or the clerk to the 
justices, within time”, not when the 
summons is served, unless the 
contrary is specifically expressed in 
the offence creating provision or 
Act. Davies J recognised that whilst 
“institution” and “commencement” 
can be construed as having the 
same meaning, they are not “always 
synonymous”, it will very much be 
dependent on the context in which 
they are used. Provided the 
summons is properly served, then 
should the accused fail to attend at 
the magistrates’ court as directed, 
the court may in accordance with 
s.11 of the MCA 1980 proceed in 
their absence, provided the 
prosecutor is in attendance, or issue 
a warrant of arrest. 
 
To proceed to trial when a summons 
is out of time, would amount to an 
abuse of process and the 
proceedings inevitably being 
stayed, nullified, or subject to a 
judicial review challenge33. 
However, given the clear policy 
reasons in protecting animals and 
the difficulty in obtaining the 
 
33 See R v Aston [2006] EWCA Crim 794, 
RSPCA v Johnson [2009] EWHC 2702 
34 It is for the prosecution to prove that 
the time limits have been complied with, 
relevant evidence together with the 
potential delay in discovering the 
commission of the actual offence, 
Parliament has in s.31(1)(a) decreed 
an extended time limitation of three 
years to commence criminal 
proceedings from the actual date of 
the alleged offence, provided those 
proceedings are commenced within 
a period of 6 months from the date 
when sufficient evidence comes to 
the knowledge of the prosecutor 
(s.31(1)(b)34. In light of the changes 
to be made by the Animal Welfare 
(Sentencing) Bill 2019 and the 
reclassification of the offences 
contained in ss.4-8 to triable either 
way, these are no longer subject to 
the time limits in s.31 by virtue of 
s.127(2) of the MCA 1980 and 
schedule 1 of the Interpretation Act 
1978.    
 
The alternative method of 
instituting proceedings by way of a 
written charge, a requisition (if 
permitted), together with a single 
justice procedure notice introduced 
by s.29 of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003, is only available to designated 
“relevant prosecutors”, whilst a 
Local Authority is designated, the 
RSPCA is not and therefore must 
see para 31 in Chesterfield Poultry v 
Sheffield Mags Court [2019] EWHC 2953 
UK Centre for Animal Law | Volume 3, Issue 2 December 2019 
  
13 
follow the s.1 MCA 1980 
procedure35. Whilst this method is 
mainly aimed at simplifying the 
reporting of traffic offences, the 
High Court in Brown v DPP [2019] 
EWHC 798, as with laying of an 
information, drew a clear 
procedural distinction between 
issuing a written notice on the one 
hand and the actual serving of the 
documents on the other and that 
written charge will deemed to have 
been issued on the date it was 
completed, provided this was within 
the 6 month time limit and not 
when served, or in the public 
 
35 See CJA (New method of instituting 
proceedings (Specification of relevant 
prosecutors) Order 2016 SSI 430 
domain as contended by the 
appellants. In a cautionary warning 
to prosecutors, Irwin LJ noted that 
any “inordinate or unwarranted or 
unjustified but significant delay” 
between the issuing and actual 
service “should not and cannot go 
without a remedy” namely an abuse 
of process. To avoid any difficulties 
prosecutors should strive to ensure 
both the issuing and actual service 
occurred within the 6-month 
limitation period.  
 
This is especially important if the 
difficulties highlighted in Dougal v 
UK Centre for Animal Law | Volume 3, Issue 2 December 2019 
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CPS [2018] EWHC 1367 are to be 
avoided, in which High Court 
distinguishing the decision in R v 
Scunthorpe Justices exp McPhee 
[1998] EWHC 228, unequivocally 
ruled that “if no information is laid 
within the period of six months, but 
an indictable offence is later 
charged and then subsequently 
amended to a summary offence, 
that amendment does not avoid the 
consequences of the statutory time 
limit” in s.127 of the MCA 1980. 
This, it is contended, would be 
equally applicable to s.31 and that a 
prosecutor will only be permitted to 
substitute, an s.4 unnecessary 
suffering allegation (when it 
becomes an either-way offence)  
with an s.9 welfare offence (a 
summary only offence) provided 
this arises from the same misdoing 
and if the original s.4 offence was 
brought within six months of the 
prosecutor having sufficient 
knowledge to bring proceedings, 
and within three years of the 
offence being committed. 
Otherwise the amended charge will 
be out of time and the court would 
have no jurisdiction to hear it.     
       
 
36 As stated in Chesterfield Poultry Ltd v 
Sheffield Mags Court [2019] EWHC 2953, 
this is a two- stage test, firstly there be 
Sufficiency of Evidence Test 
and meaning of “Prosecutor: 
Section 31(1)(b) 
 
Nevertheless, the legitimate aim 
underpinning the extension of time, 
must be balanced against the 
finality rule and the need for 
criminal proceedings to be 
concluded within a reasonable time 
so that any alleged offender is able 
to govern their lives with some 
degree of certainty and confidence. 
The legal test to be applied and 
which was confirmed in 
Letherbarrow v Warwick CC [2015] 
EWHC 4820, is not only must the 
prosecutor be satisfied “whether 
there is a prima facie case but 
whether the evidence is sufficient to 
justify a prosecution” in the public 
interest36. The prosecutor must be 
astute and “apply his mind” to the 
case file and in doing so take full 
account of the public interest factor, 
including the account (if any) 
provided by the defendant and the 
strength of the prosecution’s case, 
only then will a prosecutor be in a 
position to have the relevant 
knowledge. It is at this critical point 
the 6-month time limit will start to 
elapse and the prosecutor must 
either proceed to initiate 
sufficient evidence, and secondly it must 
be in the public interest to prosecute.  
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proceedings, or discontinue, or 
invite further investigation.  
 
Whilst s.30 gives expressed 
prosecutorial status to Local 
Authorities to bring proceedings 
under the Act, this does not 
preclude any other person or 
organisation from doing so37. In 
Lamont v RSPCA [2012] EWHC 1002, 
the High Court rejected the 
contention of the appellant that this 
should be narrowly construed to 
mean only bodies or organisations 
with a statutory power to 
prosecute. Accepting that the 
issuing of summons under s.31(2) 
“is a considerable one” and “not a 
power lightly to be conferred upon 
any prosecuting authority”, when 
considered “in the context of the 
Act as a whole,” there is no basis to 
conclude that Parliament intended 
to impose such a narrow restriction 
by excluding interested parties, 
including individuals, from the 
policy of the Act. Accordingly, in 
Letherbarrow v Warwickshire CC 
[2014] EWHC 4820 the High Court 
asserted that the expression 
“Prosecutor” in s.31 refers to “the 
individual who is given 
responsibility for making the 
 
37 See paras 26 in Lamont v RSPCA [2012] 
EWHC 1002  
38 Prosecuting offences in 
slaughterhouses transferred from DEFRA 
important decision whether to 
prosecute.” That person must at 
least be identifiable to avoid any 
confusion. In CPS v Riley [2016] 
EWHC 2531, the High Court 
acknowledged a clear role 
distinction between those who, on 
the one hand investigate and gather 
the evidence (in this case the FSA), 
and the prosecutors on the other 
who assess the sufficiency and 
admissibility of that evidence (in 
this case the CPS, as the FSA have no 
expressed authority to prosecute 
directly)38.  
 
Likewise, in R v Woodward [2017] 
EHWC 1008, the High Court felt 
bound by the decision in Riley which 
was factually indistinguishable from 
the disputed case. Accordingly, the 
District Judge having wrongly 
assumed that the FSA and the CPS 
as being one and the same, 
miscalculated the appropriate date 
as being when the FSA had gathered 
enough evidence to justify a 
prosecution, as opposed to when 
the CPS reviewing lawyer had 
considered the evidence 
independently in the public interest 
to warrant proceedings, which was 
to the CPS by the AG under s.3(2)(g) of the 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 ON 12 
July 2011. 
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much later and therefore still within 
the time stipulation39.  
 
Whilst in RSPCA v Johnson [2009] 
EWHC 2702 the High Court, having 
reviewed the previous authorities 
and in particular the decision in R 
(Donnachie) v Cardiff Mags Court 
[2007] EWHC 1846, was unable to 
derive any “principle of law that 
knowledge in a prosecutor begins 
immediately any employee of that 
prosecutor has the relevant 
knowledge.” To rule otherwise 
would be unduly cumbersome on a 
prosecutor and contrary to the 
purpose of the legislation.     
 
For the same reason the High Court 
in CPS v Riley [2016] EWHC 2531, 
gave warning to any prosecutor that  
the “long stop” three year time 
limitation, whilst providing a 
“margin of judgment”40 “is not a 
charter for paper-shuffling,” and 
any subsequent avoidable delays, or 
absence of case management, or 
abuse of the privilege “will not avail 
a prosecutor where the relevant 
delay has exceeded the six-month 
 
39 This case involved allegations against 
directors and individuals of cruelty 
covertly filmed at a abattoir 
40 R v Haringey Magistrates’ Court, ex p 
Amvrosiou [1996] EWHC 14, at para 23 & 
Burwell v DPP [2009] EWHC 1069 at para 
20 which involved s.11 of the Computer 
Misuse Act 1990   
period in s.31(1)(b).” On the facts 
which involved the mistreatment of 
a cow about to be slaughtered (s.4 
offence against the individual 
partners), the High Court ruled that 
whilst the evidence could have 
come before the prosecutor sooner, 
this was not sufficiently serious so 
as to render the proceedings unfair 
and that “whether in a case of 
egregious delay on the part of 
investigators impacting on the 
fairness of the proceedings there 
might be some other remedy, can 
safely be left to a case where the 
issue arises for decision”41. 
 
Similar sentiments arose in RSPCA v 
Johnson [2009] EWCA 2702, when 
Pill LJ warned that “the prosecuting 
authority is not entitled, by passing 
papers from hand to hand and 
failing to address the issue, to delay 
the running of time”42. On the 
individual facts the defendant 
himself was the author of the delay 
in commencing proceedings by not 
engaging with the investigator, 
despite repeated attempts to do so 
and therefore the District Judge was 
41 This could include specific directions, or 
a wasted costs order, or not award 
prosecution costs after conviction, or 
form part of sentence mitigation.  
42 Pill LJ followed the approach in 
Morgans v DPP [1999] 1WLR 968   
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wrong to conclude that there had be 
an abuse of process by the 
prosecutor in not bringing 
proceedings when the ill-treatment 
had been discovered and the 
defendant being identified as the 
legal owner.     
 
Whilst s.31 should be strictly 
adhered to, and the prosecutor 
rightly needs to act conscientiously 
when coming to a decision and 
exercise “especial care”43 in doing 
so, at the same time it does not 
impose an arbitrary duty and 
embodies a degree of latitude. As 
the High Court clearly recognised in 
R v Woodward [2017] EWHC 1008, 
before coming to a decision the 
relevant prosecutor must be 
afforded a reasonable time to 
properly evaluate the material 
evidence disclosed by the 
investigator. Additionally, in RSPCA 
v Johnson [2009] EWHC 2702, Pill LJ 
acknowledged that it would be 
contrary to the public interest if a 
prosecution was commenced other 
than on “good grounds” and then 
only if the evidence has been 
properly considered by an “expert 
mind” with “appropriate skills to 
consider whether there is sufficient 
 
43 Para 23(iii) in R v Woodward [2017] 
EWHC 1008 
44 See also para 57 for similar observations 
in Lamont v RSPCA [2012] EWHC 1002 
information to justify a 
prosecution” provided always this is 
not misused to take full advantage 
of the extended time44.   
 
The whole question of prosecutorial 
time limits again came to be 
considered by the High Court in 
Chesterfield Poultry Ltd v Sheffield 
Mags Court [2019] EWHC45. This 
case involved the application of 
regulation 41 in Welfare of Animals 
at Time of Killing Regs 201546 and 
whether or not the CPS had 
commenced proceedings in time. 
The case involved a prosecution 
brought by the CPS on behalf of the 
FSA into the treatment of chickens 
found dead at the defendant’s 
premises.  
 
Having considered the previous 
authorities in some detail, Males LJ 
was firmly of the view that the 
relevant date for the purposes of 
calculating the time limits to 
prosecution is not when the 
prosecutor initially receives the file, 
or decides to authorise a 
prosecution in the public interest, as 
favoured by Hickbottom LJ in 
Woodward. The relevant date (if 
different to the authorisation date) 
45 The judgment was handed down on the 
6 November 2019 
46 An identical provision to s.31 of the 
AWA 2006 
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is when the prosecutor reviews and 
considers the file of evidence “so 
that knowledge of the content has 
been imparted” sufficiently to 
satisfy the statutory test (the review 
date). Accordingly, the High Court 
on clear authority rejected the 
claimant’s contention the relevant 
date was when the CPS received the 
file not when the file was later 
reviewed with a view to 
prosecution.     
 
This will be determined on a case by 
case basis with some cases 
obviously being more complex than 
others depending on whether it is a 
multi-handed case of sustained 
offending over a period of time, or 
an isolated incident of mal-
treatment involving vulnerable 
individuals. Equally, the type of 
evidence to be reviewed, such has 
video evidence obtained covertly, 
hearsay and bad character evidence 
and points of law/admissibility 
needing Counsel’s opinion, the 
importance of obtaining veterinary 
expert opinion all take time to 
process and will often form part of 
an ongoing review. Nevertheless, it 
can never be justified for any 
prosecutor to hide behind the 
statutory time limits to simply 
postpone this decision 
unnecessarily as a convenient way 
to circumvent the statutory duty in 
s.31. This will be especially 
important if the initial investigation 
is focused on a suspected s.4 
offence which is not subject to s.31, 
but later due to a lack of evidence, 
downgraded to an s.9 inquiry which 
is. 
 
Certificate of confirmation 
and a question of jurisdiction: 
Section 31(2) 
 
Section 31(2) allows the 
prosecution to formally 
acknowledge the date on which 
sufficient evidence factually existed 
to justify a prosecution under the 
Act. This is not a mere formality, but 
a process to ensure certainty for 
both parties as to jurisdiction, 
subject to an extended time 
limitation. Recognising that this may 
give the prosecutor a certain 
amount of “undue power” in 
asserting the timescale, and 
therefore as a matter of policy, a 
certificate must strictly comply with 
the statutory requirements, the 
High Court in Chesterfield Poultry 
Ltd v Sheffield Mags Court [2019] 
EWHC 2953, rejected a claim that 
the presentation of a certificate 
invokes article 6. The issuing of a 
certificate is a formal step to inform 
the defendant that the proceedings 
are procedurally in time, and does 
not deny his right to a fair trial under 
Article 6. 
UK Centre for Animal Law | Volume 3, Issue 2 December 2019 
  
19 
Accordingly, the certificate in order 
to comply with s.31(2)(a) must 
provide the relevant date in which 
the prosecutor subjectively forms 
the opinion that there exists 
sufficient evidence which has come 
to his knowledge to justify a 
prosecution being in the public 
interest47. Provided this is signed by 
or on behalf of the prosecutor48, 
then it becomes conclusive 
evidence of the facts stated therein 
and cannot be rebutted or 
challenged unless as was strongly 
noted in Downes v RSPCA [2017] 
EWHC 3622, the defence can clearly 
show “that there is a prima facie 
case for undermining the 
certificate” on the basis that it is 
“plainly wrong”, or factually 
inaccurate, or tarnished by 
fraudulent behaviour, or “patently 
misleading.”49  
 
Even then Knowles J considered 
“that it will seldom be proper to 
open up a lengthy evidential inquiry 
into the decision-making process” 
since to do so would not only 
undermine the bindery effect of 
 
47 See para 27 in Chesterfield Poultry v 
Sheffield Mags Court [2019] EWHC 2953 
48 There is no statutory requirement that 
the certificate itself must be dated and 
likewise the application for a summons-
see para 12 in Browning v RSPCA [2012] 
EWHC 1003 
s31(2) but it would also disrupt on- 
going proceedings. As stated by 
Males LJ in Chesterfield Poultry v 
Sheffield Magistrates Court [2019] 
EWHC 2953, whether a certificate is 
erroneous can only be determined 
on its face and without any regard 
to any extraneous material to the 
contrary which would be irrelevant 
and inadmissible. A defendant 
cannot therefore go behind the 
certificate in order to seek to 
undermine its validity in this regard, 
unless there is evidence of 
fraudulent misconduct, bad faith on 
the part of the prosecutor, or the 
prosecutor failed to act due 
diligently in deciding whether or not 
to prosecute rendering the 
proceedings unfair and an abuse of 
process. Essentially the prosecutor 
has the exclusive authority to  
determine the relevant date for the 
purposes of the time limits without 
necessarily being answerable or 
provide reasons for doing so and it 
is this that the court must be 
mindful of and guard against to 
ensure “that the conclusive 
provisions must not be manipulated 
49 In Lamont v RSPCA [2012] EWHC 1002 
William J emphasised that the expression 
“patiently misleading” is not an additional 
ground, but simply denotes that it must 
be plainly (inaccuracy) wrong on its face,  
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to deprive a defendant of a time-bar 
defence.”          
 
It follows therefore that if the 
defence is able to show that the 
certificate is tainted by fraud, or 
plainly wrong and therefore 
“inaccurate on its face”50, then 
clearly from the judgment in  
Burwell v DPP [2009] EWHC 1069, 
the certificate could not be relied 
upon in such circumstances and the 
jurisdiction of the court must be an 
open to challenge, either by judicial 
review under s.29 of the Senior 
Courts Act 1981, or alternatively as 
an abuse of process if merited on 
the facts. Nevertheless, whilst these 
are appropriate routes to a 
challenge the validity of a certificate 
depending on the grounds, the High 
Court in Lamont v RSPCA [2012] 
EWHC 1002, (preferring the 
decision in Atkinson v DPP [2004] 
EWHC 1457, to that in Burwell v DPP 
[2009] EWHC 1069, and Azam v 
Epping FDC [2009] EWHC 3177), felt 
that it would be unwise to be 
“unduly proscriptive” and that 
“there are considerable practical 
advantages if a challenge to the 
jurisdiction” is dealt with by 
Magistrates’ at a preliminary 
hearing, rather than “satellite 
litigation by way of judicial review.” 
 
50 See para 48 in Chesterfield Poultry Ltd v 
Sheffield Mags Court [2019] EWHC 2953  
If the magistrates decline 
jurisdiction, then this would clearly 
be a final determination, and 
therefore subject to a possible 
challenge under s.111 of the MCA 
1980 by way of case stated on a 
point of jurisdiction is not disputed. 
On the other hand, if the 
magistrates do accept jurisdiction, 
this brings into question whether 
this is a final determination on a 
point of jurisdiction by reason of the 
decision itself being final, although 
not the proceedings, which formed 
the opinion of the High Court in R 
(Donnachie) v Cardiff Magistrates 
[2007] 1 WLR 3085 or, as stated in 
Steames v Copping [1985] QB 920, a 
preliminary ruling accepting 
jurisdiction as a matter of law is not 
final outcome, since the on-going 
proceedings remain in-tact and 
cannot be appealed under s.111 
until such time they are concluded.  
 
This conflict of opinion was resolved 
in Downes v RSPCA [2017] EHWC 
3922 with the High Court preferring 
the decision in Steames having been 
correctly decided which was directly 
to the point of law in issue, whereas 
the decision in Donnachie was a 
judicial review challenge to the 
decision to refuse to state a case. 
Neither does the decision in 
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Steames appear to have been cited 
in Donnachie and thus in the 
opinion of Holroyde LJ, Donnachie 
“should be regarded as made per 
incuriam and should no longer be 
followed on this specific point”.   
 
Knowles J expressed a similar view 
and ruled that there is no power for 
a court to state a case in 
circumstances in which a decision is 
made to accept jurisdiction under 
s.31 of the AWA 2006. In such 
circumstances his Lordship 
accepted that whilst a claim for 
Judicial review remains open to the 
aggrieved party, the magistrates 
“should not adjourn, unless there 
are particularly good reasons to do 
so” or if leave in the meantime is 
granted to seek a judicial review. In 
all other cases  “it will very usually 
be better to carry on and complete 
the case, allowing for all matters to 
be raised on appeal at the 
conclusion of the case in the normal 
way”, or “if appropriate to do so in a 
special case” formally state a case to 
the High Court.     
 
Finding the reasoning in Downes as 
“highly persuasive” 51, the High 
Court in Highbury Poultry Farm v 
CPS [2018] EWHC 3122, had no 
 
51 despite what appears to be a relatively 
narrow ratio in the House of Lords 
decision in Atkinson v USA [1971] 1AC that 
hesitation in applying the guidance 
in Downes to the instant case in 
which a ruling by the District Judge 
that the offence contained in 
Regulation 30(1)(g) of the Welfare 
of Animals at Time of Killings Regs 
2015 SI 1782 imposed strict liability 
and  was only open to challenge by 
judicial review. Kay J with whom 
Hickinbottom LJ agreed, observed 
that whilst such a ruling may 
adversely affect the position of the 
defendant, the proceedings still 
remained “extant” until such time 
after the outcome of a contested 
trial, or the defendant decides to 
plead guilty. Either way, only then 
would an appeal by case stated be 
permissible, otherwise the most 
sensible and effective approach is 
by judicial review.            
 
Section 31(2) simply denotes “for 
the purposes” of identifying the 
date the prosecutor formed their 
opinion. Accordingly, a certificate is 
conclusive proof of that fact, but is 
not essential to it, and is left entirely 
as a matter for the prosecutor to 
decide whether or not to use it, 
which can be issued at any time, 
during the proceedings and up to 
the closing of the prosecution case. 
Naturally the better course is to 
concerns a challenge to the decision of 
magistrates whilst acting an examining 
Justices.  
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serve a properly drafted certificate 
as determinative of the time limits 
being complied with.    
 
A defective certificate does not 
render the proceedings 
automatically an abuse, unless 
promulgated by fraud. Instead the 
magistrates, regardless of the 
omission of a certificate, need to 
determine whether or not the 
proceedings were nonetheless 
properly brought within the 
statutory time limits, the burden of 
which clearly rests with the 
prosecution. In Letherbarrow v 
Warwickshire CC [2014] EWHC 
4820, the High Court ruled that this 
can be fulfilled in one of two ways, 
either by issuing a new written 
certificate which can, as happened 
in R v Woodward [2017] EWHC 
100852, include the issuing of a 
second certificate to rectify any 
honest and genuine error made in 
the first one, or alternatively by 
“adducing evidence of fact showing 
who made the decision that a 
 
52 In Woodward, the prosecutor had 
inserted the wrong date to justify a 
prosecution by honest mistake, by noting 
the date when the evidence was collated, 
and not the correct date when he had 
sufficiency reviewed it. The DJ had 
erroneously concentrated on earlier 
certificate rather than whether the 
second certificate was valid.  
prosecution was justified and 
when.” If the latter course is taken, 
then Hinkinbottom LJ in 
Letherbarrow was firmly of the view 
that “all evidence (including 
documentary) can, and must be 
considered.” 
 
S.127 of the MCA 1980 and 
offences under the Welfare 
of Farmed Animals 
Regulations 
 
Section 12(1) of the AWA 2006 
provides the relevant minister with 
a discretionary power to make 
regulations specifically aimed at 
promoting the welfare and progeny 
of animals, including the creation of 
summary offences (s.12(2)). One 
such regulation is the Welfare of 
Farmed Animals (England) 
Regulations 2007 SI 2078 which 
came into effect on 1st October 
2007. Any person responsible for a 
farmed animal53 commits a 
summary offence54 under 
regulation 7 if they fail, without 
53 Farmed animal is defined in reg 3 and 
means “an animal bred or kept for the 
production of food, wool, skin or other 
farming purposes but not fish, retile or 
amphibian, wholly for competition, 
sporting activities, scientific testing or 
living wild.   
54 Under regulation 9 the offender on 
conviction is a risk of a six-month custody 
and or unlimited fine 
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lawful authority or excuse55, to 
ensure under regulation 4 that all 
reasonable steps are taken to 
maintain high standards of welfare 
across a broad range of 30 specified 
welfare conditions listed in schedule 
1, such as drink and feed, adequate 
lighting and ventilation.  
 
However, the regulations are silent 
on which particular time limitation 
applied creating a level of 
uncertainty which had to be 
addressed by the High Court in 
Staffordshire CC v Sherratt & Sigley 
[2019] EWHC 1416. The 
respondent’s faced multiple 
offences in relation to the poor 
welfare conditions of a number of 
cows and calves kept at two farms. 
Six of these specifically related to 
breaches of regulation 7, whilst 
another twelve where brought 
under s.9 of the AWA 2006. 
 
All 18 offences were commenced 8 
months after the commission date, 
bringing into question whether the 
regulation 7 offences where time 
barred and out of jurisdiction under 
s.127 or in time under s.31. 
Challenging the ruling of the District 
Judge that the former applied, the 
appellants contended that this 
 
55 Such expressions are well established 
and amount to a question of fact subject 
to supporting evidence-see R v Jodie 
plainly conflicted with the purpose 
and substance of the Regulations. 
Whether the allegations related to 
domestic animals or farmed animals 
the same investigative challenges 
and policies aims arose and 
therefore any differences in 
prosecutorial time limits would be 
anomalous, illogical and prohibitive, 
especially, as in this case, the 
defendant is charged under both 
provisions but with potentially 
different prosecutions period.  This 
contention was further advanced on 
the basis that the offence creating 
provisions are worded in 
substantively the same form and 
therefore ought to benefit from the 
same legal effect of s.31.  
 
In rejecting these contentions, the 
High Court in the judgment of Flaux 
LJ ruled that as a matter of 
procedure, the statutory language 
leads inescapably to these different 
consequences. Without 
unequivocal language to the 
contrary, s.127 cannot be 
disapplied. Neither can any views 
formulated in any advisory material 
be elevated to statutory intent. Faux 
LJ alluded that if s.31 had been 
intended to equally apply to the 
2007 Regulations, then this could 
[2003] EWCA Crim 8 in the context of 
offensive weapons.     
UK Centre for Animal Law | Volume 3, Issue 2 December 2019 
  
24 
have easily have been provided for 
in s.12(3)(a) “in terms that an 
offence created by the Regulations 
would be treated as an offence 
under the 2006 Act.”  
 
The High Court was fortified in its 
ruling by reference to s.12(5) which 
gives expressed authority for any 
regulatory offences to be treated as 
a relevant offence for the purposes 
of a search warrant under s.23, and 
that “the absence of any equivalent 
reference to s.31” is materially 
significant to suggest that 
Parliament must have intended to 
statutorily exclude any regulatory 
offence from the ambit of s.31 
without expressed intent to the 
contrary. Strong reliance can also be 
found in other legislation and vividly 
illustrated in the Mandatory Use of 
Closed-Circuit Television in 
Slaughterhouses (England) Regs 
2018 SI 556, implemented in 
accordance with s.12 of the AWA 
2006. Regulation 14 is drafted in 
identical form as s.31, and shows a 
clear intent by Parliament to not 
only disapply s.127 but specifically 
grant a three-year prosecution 
period for offences in regulation 9 & 
10 relating to any breaches of the 
duties in regulation 3 on the 
installation and retention of a CCTV 
in all areas where live animals are 
present.  
 
Likewise, regulation 18 of the Food 
Safety & Hygiene (England) Regs 
2013 SI 2996 gives equal effect to a 
three-year prosecution period for 
offences contained therein as does 
s.24 of the Food Safety Act 1990. 
Also, the Road Traffic Offenders Act 
1988 in common parlance with 
other examples has its own self-
contained prosecution time period 
in s.6. Whilst the distinction 
between the two statutory regimes 
is arguably rationally incoherent in 
terms of investigating the welfare of 
farmed animals as opposed to 
domestic animals, this can only be 
rectified by Parliament. In the 
meantime, when dealing with 
farmed animal cases, both 
investigators and prosecutors will 
undoubtedly have in mind the ruling 
in Sherratt & Sigley when 
considering the appropriate 
charge(s) and under which 
legislation.  
 
However, if the prosecution decides 
to charge under s.9 of the AWA 
2006, in what is clearly a farmed 
animal case, so as to avoid the strict 
6- month time limit, then such a 
move is likely to lead to an abuse of 
process challenge on the grounds 
that it deprives the defendant of 
this procedural protection, clearly 
proscribed by Parliament in the 
regulations. No matter how 
inconvenient it is to the 
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prosecution, the rule cannot be 
circumvented simply by charging a 
different offence because the 





It is incumbent on both 
investigators and prosecutors alike 
to ensure they fulfil their statutory 
duties under the Animal Welfare Act 
effectively. The importance of 
protecting animals from harm is 
obvious, but this must rightly be 
balanced against the need to avoid 
uncertainty and inordinate delay. 
The imposition of prosecution time 
limitations is not a burden, but a 
 
56 See the reasoning of the House of Lords 
in R v J [2005] 1 AC 562 and also R v Perrett 
[2019] EWCA Crim 685  
measure of ensuring criminal 
proceedings for relatively minor 
offences are concluded in a timely 
manner. Those who investigate and 
prosecute animal welfare offences 
occupy a position of privilege under 
s.31 and therefore need to observe 
the exigencies of the provision 
which has the clear effect to extend 
the ability to bring criminal 
proceedings long out of time in 
contrast to the strict six-month rule 
in s.127 MCA 1980.  Whilst the s.4-8 
offences will no longer bound by 
this rule, this does not lessen the 
need to comply with the objectives 
of the Criminal Procedure Rules in 
dealing with cases expeditiously.          
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